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ABSTRACT
Taxation is one of the effective tools to discourage smoking. Increase of cigarette tax has 
a significant effect in generating additional revenue to the government due to the inelastic 
nature of the cigarette. In this study, the estimated price elasticity of demand for cigarettes 
in Malaysia is -0.28 and -0.49 in short run and long run; respectively. Hence, demand for 
cigarettes is inelastic or less responsive to the changes in price. Therefore, estimating the 
optimal cigarette tax rate is one of the strategies to ensure that the price of cigarette, after 
tax, is high enough to reduce consumption of cigarette. At the same time, it generates 
maximum tax revenue for the government. Using yearly time series data from 1980 until 
2009, a Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) method is applied to estimate 
the demand elasticity of cigarettes and the optimal cigarettes excise tax. In this study, the 
estimated optimal real excise tax rate is 0.186 sen per stick which is 27.4% higher than 
the real excise tax in 2009. The increase in real revenue earned after imposing an optimal 
excise tax is 24.25% in the short run and 21.89% in the long run. Consequently, the expected 
reduction in consumption per capita of cigarette is 10.41% in the short run and 12.88% 
in the long run. Maximum revenues from the optimal cigarettes tax can be earmarked to 
fund a specific tobacco control policy in Malaysia
Keywords: Elasticity of demand, optimal tax rate, tax revenue
INTRODUCTION
Malaysia enacted Control of Tobacco 
Products Regulation (CTPR) in 1993, under 
the Food Act of 1983. CTPR Act 1993 was 
officially implemented on 15th May, 1994. 
Though amended a number of times, these 
regulations remain the primary legislative 
mechanism used to regulate tobacco in 
Malaysia. Cigarettes taxation is one of 
the important tools for tobacco control in 
Malaysia. According to Chaloupka et al. 
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(2000), one of the effective methods to deter 
smoking behavior is through taxation. In 
addition, Shibuya et al. (2003), describes 
that taxing of tobacco as the most cost 
effective tobacco control option in all 
regions. 
In Malaysia, cigarette tax is imposed 
on cigarette manufacturers or cigarette 
importers. Until 2004, taxes on tobacco 
were levied according to their weight. Since 
2005, Malaysia has been adopting a specific 
excise tax per stick. This tax structure is 
easier to administer since it requires only 
counting the sticks without weighing them. 
There are two different tax structures for 
domestic and imported cigarettes. In 2010, 
excise tax of RM0.26 per stick was levied on 
locally produced cigarettes sold in Malaysia; 
while, import duty was levied on imported 
cigarettes. Imported cigarettes from non-
ASEAN countries are subjected to an import 
duty of RM0.20 (US$0.05) per stick; while, 
cigarettes imported from ASEAN countries 
are levied RM0.10 (US$0.03) import duty 
per stick. Both domestic and imported 
cigarettes are subjected to 25% sales tax 
added above the factory value with excise 
tax for domestic or above custom declared 
value for the imported ones.
Currently, locally produced cigarettes 
capture over 95% of the market. The 
excise tax on locally produced cigarettes 
is RM0.26 per stick which represents 
about 52% of retail price. This is below the 
recommendation of Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) which is 65% 
of the price per pack. Table 1 shows the 
cigarette taxes imposed by the Malaysia 
government from 1990 until 2010.
From 1990 until 2004, excise tax on 
cigarette was imposed on the weight of 
cigarette (per kg) Following 2004, it has 
been imposed that measurement based on 
per stick of cigarette. The excise tax and 
the import tax imposed on cigarettes have 
been increasing. However, the sales tax has 
remained fixed at 15% from 1990 to 1999. 
It has increased to 25% from 2001 to 2010.
The Malaysian Government earns a large 
amount of revenue from its involvement in 
the tobacco industry. In 2010, revenue from 
the excise tax on cigarette was 2% from the 
total revenue of excise tax collected by the 
government. The tobacco industry ranked 5th 
out of 92 sectors. The total economic output 
of this industry has reached RM1.7 billion 
representing about 3% of Malaysia’s Gross 
Domestic Product in 2004.
Fig.1 shows the relationship between 
the excise tax on cigarette and tax revenue 
generated by government. The figure 
reveals that the increase in excise tax on 
cigarette imposed by the government leads 
to persistent increase in tax revenue from 
1990 to 2009.
Cigarettes Demand and Cigarette Tax in 
Malaysia
Basically, price elasticity of demand is 
measures the responsiveness of quantity 
demanded to a change in price. In this 
context, it measures the percentage changes 
in quantity demanded for cigarette due to 
a change in a price of cigarette. A study 
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TABLE 1 
Cigarette Taxes 1990 – 2010
Year Import Tax 
RM/kg or RM/stick
Excise Tax  
RM/kg or RM/stick
Sales Tax 
%
1990 85/0.08 13/0.013 15
1991 135/0.12 14/0.014 15
1992-1998 162/0.15 28.60/0.028 15
1999-2000 180/0.16 40/0.039 15
2001 180/0.16 40/0.039 25
2002 216/0.2 48/0.047 25
2003 259/0.24 58/0.056 25
2004 200/0.18 58/0.056 25
2005* 0.20 0.081 25
2006 0.20 0.12 25
2007 0.20 0.15 25
2008 0.20 0.18 25
2009 0.20 0.225 25
2010 0.20 0.26 25
*Specific tax per stick was introduced (1 kg = 1100 sticks)
Source: Royal Custom Malaysia and Confederation of Malaysia Tobacco (CMTM), various years.
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Fig.1: Tax Revenue vs Excise Tax Rate (1990 – 2009)
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conducted by Hana and Nabila, (2007) using 
data on cigarette consumption, cigarette 
prices and public policies in Malaysia for 
the period from 1990 to 2004 indicates 
the estimated long-run and short-run price 
elasticity of demand was -0.57 and -0.08; 
respectively. It implies that demand is less 
responsive to price or inelastic. On the 
other hand, they have discovered that 25% 
increase in cigarette tax in 2007 has led to 
a 5.9% increase in the price of cigarette 
and 3.37% of reduction in consumption. In 
view of demand for cigarettes is inelastic, 
it indicates that lack of awareness on the 
effect of cigarettes on health, addiction and 
availability of illegal cigarettes as substitute. 
The higher excise tax on cigarette leads to 
only a slight decrease in consumption of 
cigarettes, as illustrated in Fig.2. 
Currently, Malaysia does not have 
any clear tobacco tax policy objectives. 
Although there have been several increase 
on cigarette tax in the past decade, their 
purpose was mainly to raise government 
revenue (Hana & Nabilla, 2007). Some 
aspects of the tobacco tax policy are driven 
by economic interests of tobacco farmers 
and cigarette producers. Despite these 
concerted effort to curb smoking through 
the enforcement of tobacco control policies, 
Malaysian efforts are still lagging behind 
neighboring countries such as Singapore and 
Thailand. The lack of effective coordination 
among the agencies involved in tobacco 
control often leaves obvious violations of 
CTPR unpunished. 
The reasons of raising cigarette excise 
taxes,are to increase government revenue, 
to protect children and youth, to improve 
public health and to correct externalities. 
The entire reasoning further poses a question 
as to what extent the optimal tax should be 
 
Source: Royal Custom Malaysia and Confederation of Malaysia Tobacco (CMTM), various years. 
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Cigarettes Demand and Tax Strategy in Malaysia
103Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 99 - 114 (2013)
imposed on cigarette. From the economic 
perspective, the optimal tax can be achieved 
when the marginal cost of the last cigarette 
consumed equals to its marginal social 
benefits. However, according to Warner, 
Chaloupka and Cook (1995) and Chaloupka 
et al (2000), evaluation and identification of 
the negative externalities associated with 
direct smoking and direct environmental 
effect from tobacco smoke are abundant 
and complicated. Therefore, in order for 
a country to set the optimal level of tax, it 
should take into account the national health 
objectives. Such objectives depend on 
societal value such as the extent to which the 
children should be protected from the effect 
of smoke polluted environment. Apart from 
the health and social objectives of imposing 
tax on cigarettes, some governments may 
levy taxes with the intention of maximizing 
revenues. An empirical evidence from a 
study in South-East Asia reports on the 
potential revenue generated from tobacco 
taxes, Arunatilake (2003). This study 
assumes that the real GDP per capita in the 
region is growing at 4% annually. With that 
assumption, a 5% increase in real cigarette 
prices induced by higher taxes would 
generate substantial additional revenue 
for the region by 2010. Hence, this paper 
estimates the price elasticity of demand for 
cigarette and evaluates the effect of cigarette 
excise tax on cigarette consumption. The 
determination of the optimal excise tax rate 
is essential to ensure maximum tax revenue 
is generated. Thus, it can be channeled 
towards tobacco control programs with the 
aim to reduce prevalence of smoking and 
ultimately change the consumption behavior 
of smoking.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The estimation on demand for cigarette has 
been of great interest to many economists 
since the Surgeon General’s warning in 
1964 on the causal relationship between 
cigarette smoking and smoking related 
diseases. Smoker’s responsiveness to 
changes in cigarette price has been estimated 
in many studies from different countries 
over varying time periods. Price is only 
one of several factors which may influence 
demand. Analyses usually attempt to assess 
simultaneously the effect of price and other 
major potential influences such as income, 
public information policies and cigarette 
advertising. The extent to which demand 
for cigarettes responds to changes in price 
can be measured using price elasticity of 
demand. Majority of the empirical evidence 
available are based on studies of populations 
in developed countries. They suggest 
that 10% increase in cigarette prices will 
result in 2.5% to 5% reduction in cigarette 
demand (Chaloupka & Warner, 2000). 
In low and middle-income countries, the 
study on demand for cigarette has utilized 
the national-level aggregate consumption 
data and individual or household-level 
survey data. Hu and Mao (2002) estimates 
the aggregate time series data for China. 
The finding is that the price elasticities of 
demand range from -0.54 to -0.64. The same 
study has been conducted, in Malaysia, using 
data on cigarette consumption, cigarette 
prices and public policies for the period 
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from 1990 to 2004 (Hana & Nabila, 2007). 
The study employs time-series regression 
analysis applying the error-correction model 
(ECM). The estimated long-run and short-
run price elasticity of demand are -0.57 and 
-0.08; respectively. It indicates that demand 
is less responsive to price in the short-run. 
Similar studies have been conducted in other 
countries including Vietnam and Myanmar, 
It has been reported that Vietnam’s price 
elasticity has reached -0.53 (Eozenou & 
Fishburn, 2009) and Myanmar with -0.128 
(Nyo et al., 2003). Although different 
countries may have used different methods 
and data set to estimate the impact of 
cigarette price on cigarette demand, those 
studies have shown that increase in the 
price of cigarettes will lead to significant 
reductions in cigarette smoking.
Cigaret te  consumption imposes 
externalities through greater health care 
expenditure, negative effects on second 
hand smokers and loss of productivity. In 
view of these externalities, smokers make 
socially inefficient consumption decisions 
which lead to social welfare loss. Efficient 
government intervention might be better to 
facilitate the internalization of externalities 
through Pigouvian taxes (Pigou, 1962). 
Thus, bringing consumption closer to the 
Pareto-efficient level by raising the price 
(Holcombe, 1996). Pigouvian taxes are 
known as “sin taxes” imposed on goods such 
as alcohol and tobacco. 
Ev idence  f rom deve loped  and 
developing countries show that price 
increase on cigarette are highly effective 
in reducing demand (Chaloupka et al., 
2000). These findings suggest that raising 
taxes on cigarettes can be an effective 
policy in reducing smoking. Higher taxes 
cause higher price of cigarettes. Hence, 
induce some smokers to quit and deter 
others to start smoking. The higher price of 
cigarettes reduces the number of ex-smokers 
returning to cigarettes and decreases the 
amount of cigarettes consumption among 
existing smokers. Ahmad and Franz (2008) 
concludes that a higher cigarette price 
through taxes reduces smoking prevalence, 
improves the population health, reduces 
medical cost and net gain in tax revenue for 
the government. 
Raising cigarette tax is advantageous 
to governments in terms of increasing 
revenue. In an estimate by Sunley, Yurekli 
and Chaloupka (2000), an increase of 10% 
in cigarette taxes leads to an increase of 
almost 7% on average in cigarette tax 
revenues. An effective tax policy by the 
government is to set taxes on products that 
create the least economic distortion. Ramsey 
(1927) designs an optimal tax theory which 
identifies distortion minimizing tax policy 
and the second best levels of taxes. The 
“Ramsey Rule” states that tax rate should 
vary inversely with the elasticity of demand 
for products by holding the elasticity of 
supply constant. Given the evidence that 
demand for cigarette is relatively inelastic 
in developed and developing countries 
(Chaloupka et al., 2000), the Ramsey Rule 
on cigarettes taxes hold. 
As dictated in “Ramsey Rule” (Ramsey, 
1927), the level of taxes is inversely related 
to the price-elasticity of demand by holding 
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the supply elasticity constant. Thus, an 
increase in tax minimizes the welfare loss. 
At the same time, it leads to a significant 
increase in tax revenue. Townsend (1996) 
indicates that for every one percent increase 
in the excise tax, government revenue in 
UK is expected to increase between 0.6 
and 0.9%.
The rate of cigarette excise tax that 
maximizes revenue is illustrated using the 
Laffer curve. An economist, Arthur Laffer 
(1986), suggests that beyond some tax rate, 
higher tax rate will reduce the tax base so 
much that revenues will actually decline. 
The following Laffer Curve illustrates 
the relationship between tax revenue and 
the tax rate.
Using the Laffer Curve model to derive 
the relationship between the excise rate 
and budget revenue in Ukrainian tobacco 
industry, Krasovsky et al., (2001), it is 
estimated the revenue maximizing excise 
rate to be approximately 11.3% in constant 
1997 Hryvnias currency. The excise rate, in 
Ukraine, in 2001, shows an upward sloping 
portion of the Laffer Curve. Therefore, 
budget revenues can be significantly 
increased if the excise rate is increased. A 
study in South Africa by Van Walbeek, 2000, 
using a Laffer Curve theory for years 1998 
and 1999, shows that if the government had 
set the tax at the revenue maximizing levels, 
an additional revenue of R700 million and 
R300 million for those two years could be 
generated. Theoretically, there is a trade off 
in raising cigarette taxes. Government gets 
more revenue on the packs of cigarettes sold. 
However, there is likely to be fewer packs 
sold as the tax rates increase. Eventually, tax 
revenue declines. Apart from taxes, other 
effective tobacco control measures include 
information campaigns, comprehensive 
bans on advertisement and promotion, 
prominent warning labels, and clean indoor 
air restrictions (Kenkel & Chen, 2000; 
Woolery et al., 2000).
MODELS AND METHODOLOGY
Following the methodology considered by 
Townsend, Roderick and Cooper (1994), a 
single equation model with an assumption 
that the consumption function is a log-linear 
function is employed. The log linear demand 
model that is estimated in this study:
lnCt  
= β0 + β1lnPt + β2lnGDPt + β3Tt  
 + β4lnRgt + ε                  [1]
where Ct is the quantity or number of 
cigarette sticks consumed per capita in year 
t, Pt is the real pre-tax price of cigarettes in 
year t, GDPt is real GDP per capita in year t
Rgt is the tobacco regulation and Tt is the 
cigarette excise tax rate.
All the variables are in natural logarithms. 
However, Rgt is represented by dummy 
variable (DMY) to allow the estimates 
of model parameters to be interpreted as 
elasticities. Consumption per capita is the 
total quantity of domestic cigarettes plus 
imported cigarettes, measured by number 
of cigarette sticks, divided by the size of 
population aged 18 years and above. Pt, is 
the pre-tax price of cigarettes equivalent to 
current price of cigarettes minus the excise 
cigarettes tax and GDP per capita is the real 
Norashidah M. N., Nik Mustapha R. A. and Mastura Y.
106 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 99 - 114 (2013)
GDP divided by the number of population. 
T is an excise tax in the form of per unit tax 
levied on locally produced cigarettes sold in 
Malaysia and Rg is non-price instruments. 
The ‘TakNak’ or ‘Don’t Want’ national 
anti-smoking campaign is considered as 
a regulation dummy, DMY. The ‘TakNak’ 
anti-smoking campaign was launched on 9 
February, 2004. The campaign was a 5 year 
program with initial budget allocation of 
RM20 million. This campaign is considered 
in this study since the total budget for this 
5 year program is RM100 million. Given 
the vast expenditure dedicated to this mass 
media campaign, an empirical estimation of 
its effectiveness is important to discern how 
it influences demand for cigarettes.
The basic unit root tests are performed 
in this analysis to determine the order of 
integration of the series. The classical unit 
root tests, namely the Augemented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey & Fuller, 1981, 
Said and Dickey, 1984), Phillips and Perron 
(PP) (1998) test and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) (1992) test have been 
carried out on the variables at levels and in 
first differences, with the optimal lag lengths 
for each test chosen automatically by the 
E-views 6 software. In order to examine the 
long run relationship among the variables, 
this study employs the method of Fully 
Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) 
developed by Phillips and Hansen (1990). 
In applying the FMOLS, the existence 
of co-integration relation between a set 
of I(1) variables must be satisfied. The 
FMOLS estimator corrects the demand 
model’s variables for endogeneity due to 
co-integration and modifies least square 
to account for serial correlation effects. 
FMOLS yields t-ratios that is asymptotically 
normally distributed and independent 
of the correct choice of lag length of 
the underlying vector auto-regression. 
According to Borland and Quliaris (1994), 
the FMOLS estimator permits inference 
based on normal distribution theory ‘by 
means of a non-parametric correction’ to 
the data that effectively eliminates any 
long-run dependence between the true 
residuals of the co-integrating regression 
and the innovations of the explanatory 
variables. Residuals generated from each 
co-integrating relations represent deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium. It can be 
used to estimate the short run dynamics of 
demand models using the Error- Correction 
Model:
Where ecm t−1 i s  the  res idual  f rom 
estimating demand models using FMOLS. 
The estimation of the error correction 
parameter in the model, λ is to measure 
the speed of adjustment of the system to 
disequilibrating shock. The coefficients with 
negative and larger values indicate faster 
adjustment to economic shocks. Bannerjee 
et al., (1993) shows that a highly significant 
error correction term with a negative co-
efficient is a further proof of the existence 
of stable long run relationship and relatively 
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more efficient method of establishing Co-
integration. 
The optimal excise tax rate is estimated 
based on a basic equation of Laffer Curve: 
R(T) = αT – βT2 where R(T) is tax revenue 
and T is tax rate, the estimated regression of 
optimal cigarette excise tax:
Rt = α0 + δ1 Tt + δ2 T2t + δ4GDPt+εt,   [2]
where t indicates years, R is real tax 
revenue from cigarettes, T is the real 
excise tax on per stick of cigarette 
measured in Ringgit, GDP is real 
income per capita and transformed into 
natural logarithm, and εt is the error 
term. T2 is real excise tax squared. The 
inclusion of both tax rate and its square 
in the regression equation is to allow 
the relationship between revenue and 
tax rate to be non-linear as depicted 
by Laffer curve model. Both R and T 
are adjusted for the inflation using the 
consumer price index (CPI) with year 
2000 as the base year.
All the variables of the Laffer Curve 
in equation 1 are also tested for their 
stationarity and FMOLS is applied to 
estimate the parameters. All the standard 
diagnostic tests are applied for these time 
series data
In order to estimate the impact of 
increase excise tax rate of cigarette on 
the expected government revenue, the 
following mathematical relationship 
between the changes in the excise tax rate 
and government revenue is applied:
( ) ( )
[1 ( )]
d TR d T Tx
TR T Pµ
µ= +
 
               [3]
where ( )d TR
TR
 is the percentage change in 
goverment revenue. ( )d T
T
 is changes in the 
excise tax rate, µµ is the price elasticity of 
demand, and TP  is the tax proportion of the 
retail price of cigarette.
Equation 3 shows that an increase 
in government revenue, as a result of 
an increase in the tax rate, is inversely 
proportional to the absolute size of the price 
elasticity. A relatively inelastic demand 
implies greater revenue potential and vice 
versa.
The empirical analysis for price 
elasticities and optimal tax rate in this study 
use annual data from 1980 to 2009. These 
data were obtained from the Royal Custom 
of Malaysia and Department of Statistic 
Malaysia.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The empirical results of ADF, PP and KPSS 
show that all the variables in both models 
are stationary at first difference. Since all the 
variables are I(1), Fully Modified Ordinary 
Least Square (FMOLS) is employed to 
estimate the long run elasticity of the 
models. Followed by Error Correction 
Model (ECM) to determine the short run 
elasticity
From the above estimations, price of 
cigarettes and real excise tax rate have 
a negative and significant impact on 
consumption of cigarettes in long run and 
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short run. Demand for cigarettes is inelastic 
in short run and long run. However, price 
is less sensitive in the short run where 
an increase in cigarette price by 10% 
reduces cigarette consumption by 2.8% in 
short run, and 4.9% in the long run. The 
coefficient of excise tax is tax elasticity 
which measures the responsiveness of 
changes in consumption per capita due to 
changes in the excise tax rate. Hence, from 
the result shown in Table 2 and Table 3, 
the coefficients of excise tax rate is highly 
significant at 1% level and gives a negative 
impact on the cigarette consumption in short 
run and long run. In this study, real income 
per capita (GDP) is found to have a negative 
relationship on cigarette consumption 
in short run and positive relationship in 
TABLE 2 
Estimation of Long-run Elasticity 
Dependent Variable: lnC
Coefficient T-ratio
Constant 4.5040 6.3804***
lnP -0.4941 -2.4396**
lnT -0.4739 -13.466***
lnGDP 0.3753 4.4833***
DMY 0.0584 1.528
Notes: The following notation applies; C= Consumption per capita, P= real pretax price, T=real excise 
tax rate, GDP = real GDP per capita and DMY represent Rg,  non price instrument (Dummy variable)
‘***’ indicates the test statistic is significant at the 1% significance level, ‘**’ indicates the 5% 
significance level, and ‘*’ indicates the 10% significance level.
TABLE 3 
Estimation of Short-run Elasticity
Dependent Variable:∆lnCPC
Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant -0.0042 -0.5195
∆lnP -0.2808 -2.5340**
∆lnT -0.3843 -13.665***
∆lnGDP -0.0412 -0.2965
DMY  0.0175 1.5470
ECTCt-1 -0.6814 -7.3003***
R-Squared = 0.717
R-Bar-Squared = 0.647
F-stat = 10.174[0.000]
Standard Error of Regression = 0.055
Notes: The following notation applies; ∆C= Consumption per capita, ∆P= real pretax price, ∆T=real 
excise tax rate, ∆GDP = real GDP per capita and DMY = Non price instrument (Dummy variable)   
∆ = first difference.‘***’ indicates the test statistic is significant at the 1% significance level, ‘**’ 
indicates the 5% significance level, and ‘*’ indicates the 10% significance level.
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long run. It implies that cigarettes are an 
inferior goods in the short run yet normal 
goods in the long run. However, real 
income per capita is only significant in the 
long run. Finally, the results of dummy 
variable (DMY) that represent government 
non-price instrument Rg, indicate that the 
government campaign is ineffective either 
in short run or long run. The campaign is 
successful in increasing the awareness of 
the anti-smoking messages (Foong, 2005). 
However, the positive relationship between 
the variable and consumption of cigarette 
in this study implies that the government’s 
objective to reduce cigarette consumption is 
unsuccessful. The coefficient of ECTCt-1 is 
equal to -0.68,which implies that deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium in demand 
for cigarette is corrected by 68% over 
annually at 1% level of significance. The 
higher significant error correction term, the 
further is proof of the existence of a stable 
long run relationship. Bannerje et al., (1993) 
argues that testing the significance of error 
correction term with negative coefficient is 
supposed to be relatively more efficient way 
of establishing cointegration.
In view of demand for cigarette in short 
run and long run is inelastic, an increase of 
tax on cigarette fits into the ‘Ramsey Rule’ 
(Ramsey, 1927). Evidently, increases of tax 
on cigarette leads to significant reduction in 
cigarette consumption and, at the same time, 
increases tax revenue. The optimal tax is 
estimated to ensure a maximum tax revenue 
to the government. The following Table 
4 shows the estimation results from the 
FMOLS analysis for the optimal tax model. 
The diagnostic tests show all the variables 
are I(1) or stationary at first difference. The 
following Table 4 shows the estimation 
results from the FMOLS analysis.
The estimated coefficient of T is positive 
and significant at 1% level. The positive sign 
of T implies that increases in real excise 
tax rate will increase the tax revenue. The 
opposite sign for the tax rate squared (T2) 
captures the diminishing effects of the 
tax in the parabolic equation which is a 
pattern consistent with the shape of Laffer 
Curve shape. The estimated coefficients of 
real GDP which is positive is also highly 
significant determinant of real excise tax 
revenue in this model.
TABLE 4 
Results of the FMOLS Estimation
R =  -5.2437  +   19.9882Tt –    53.6910T2t   +  1.8609 lnGDPt 
(-2.6953)**     (2.8531)***      (-1.2859)           (8.3118)***
Notes: The following notation applies; R= Real Revenue, T=real excise tax rate, RGDP = real income per 
capita and T2 = real excise ta squared “***” indicates the test statistic is significant at the 1% significance 
level, “**” indicates the 5% significance level and “*” at 10% significance level. Figures in parentheses  
( ) refer to t statistics.
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To determine the optimal tax rate that 
maximizes tax revenue, the real revenue 
(R) is differentiated with respect to real tax 
rate (T), 
R = -5.2437 + 19.9882Tt – 53.6910T2t 
+ 1.8609lnGDPt
𝜕R/𝜕T = 19.9882 – 2(53.6910)Tt
A necessary condition for revenue 
maximization is 𝜕R/𝜕T = 0.
Therefore, real excise tax rate (T) is 
18.6% or nominal excise tax rate is 28.7%. 
Considering 𝜕2R/𝜕T2 = negative, it 
confirms that T = 18.6% which is the 
optimal real excise tax rate that maximizes 
tax revenue. The calculated optimal real 
excise tax rate is 27.4% higher than the real 
excise tax rate of is 14.6% in 2009.
From the above estimated price 
elasticity of demand for cigarette and the 
applied mathematical relationship between 
changes in tax revenue and changes in the 
excise tax rate derived in Equation 3, the 
expected increase in government revenue 
will be 24.25% in the short run and 21.89% 
in the long run. It is due to 27.4% increase 
in real excise tax rate. It should also note 
that the excise tax proportion of the retail 
price of cigarette is 41% in 2009. At the 
same time, using the estimated tax elasticity 
of demand, -0.38 in the short run and -0.47 
in the long run, 27.4% change in the excise 
tax rate will reduce cigarette consumption 
by 10.41% and 12.88% in the short run and 
long run; respectively.
CONCLUSION
Demand for cigarettes in Malaysia is 
inelastic in both short run and long run. 
Price is highly significant determinant of 
demand. It is consistent with the theory 
that the long run price elasticity of demand 
is higher than the short run. Excise tax 
is one of the instruments frequently used 
as a government policy tool to reduce 
consumption of cigarettes. The significant 
and negative impact of excise tax rate on 
consumption of cigarettes, both in short 
run and long run shows that the policy of 
increasing excise tax rate on cigarettes is 
an effective measure to reduce consumption 
of cigarettes. Although tax has a significant 
effect in reducing cigarette consumption, the 
inelastic demand for cigarette will continue 
to generate additional tax revenue. As the 
tax rate is increased, the quantity of cigarette 
purchased will decline less than increase 
in price. Thus, the tax revenue is derived 
from people who continuously purchase 
cigarettes. Determining the optimal cigarette 
excise tax rate is one of the cigarette tax 
strategies that the government should 
pursue. The current excise tax rate provides 
ample opportunities for the government 
to increase excise tax with the objectives 
of generating maximum tax revenue and 
reducing cigarette consumption.
The estimation of optimal cigarette tax 
is done using the Laffer curve model. It is 
estimated that the optimal real excise tax 
is 0.186 sen per stick or 0.287 sen nominal 
excise tax per stick. That is about 27.4% 
higher than the excise tax rate in 2009. Based 
on the findings of this study, Malaysian 
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government should continue increasing the 
excise tax rate until the optimal level of tax 
rate is achieved. Imposing the optimal tax 
on cigarettes will increase tax revenue to 
the government. The expected increase in 
government revenue in short run is 24.8% 
and long run 21.89%. Higher excise tax rate 
on cigarette will be passed to the consumer 
in terms of higher price of cigarette. The 
negative relationship between price and 
demand of cigarette will further decrease 
consumption of cigarettes. It is estimated 
at 10.41% and 12.88% in the short run and 
long run, respectively.
In the attempt to maximize the taxation 
effect and reduce smoking, government 
should efficiently allocate the tax revenue 
towards tobacco control program and 
strategies. According to Hanna and Nabila 
(2007), there is no tax or pricing policy in 
Malaysia that aims to contribute towards 
health objectives. It is timely that the 
government considers having a specific 
tobacco control policy funded from 
earmarking of revenues, cigarette tax 
increases or “sin tax”. The policy funded 
by earmarked fund should be targeted to 
increase awareness about the consequences 
of smoking habits, to reduce larger 
proportion of tobacco consumption and to 
reduce tobacco-related illness and death. 
The collected revenue from the “sin tax” 
can be channeled to more comprehensive 
programs addressing the issues of health 
resulting from tobacco usage, increasing 
the awareness and educate the public on 
the danger of smoking, implementing 
educational strategies to prevent smoking 
and other related activities. The source of 
funding for those health programs through 
earmarking of tax revenue will eradicate 
any conflict of interest between non-smoker 
taxpayers and smokers since the earmarked 
revenue is generated from the tobacco 
consumers.
Although the result of this study shows 
that anti-smoking campaigns in Malaysia is 
ineffective, there are evidence that the anti-
smoking campaigns in America have proven 
to be an effective tools in reducing cigarette 
consumption and encouraging people to quit 
smoking (Siegel, 1998). Further supported 
by a report from National Cancer Institute, 
USA (2008), it also concludes that anti-
tobacco media campaigns are effective in 
reducing smoking among youths and adults. 
Despite the insignificance of “TakNak or 
“Don’t Want”, anti-smoking mass media 
campaign must continue. The general public 
in Malaysia gives high support towards the 
implementation of anti-smoking campaign 
in the community (Halimah, 2005). The five 
years duration of “TakNak” campaign may 
not be sufficient to see the positive impact 
of the campaign. Levy and Friend (2001) 
suggests that the duration of campaign must 
be long enough to allow the effects of the 
campaign in changing social norm where 
smoking should be viewed as unacceptable. 
Siegel (1998) suggests that the campaigns 
need a consistent source of funding to ensure 
that the message is transmitted from various 
sources, consistent and repeated over a long 
period. Therefore, to maintain continuous 
running of the campaigns, it is recommended 
that earmarking of cigarette tax revenue is 
Norashidah M. N., Nik Mustapha R. A. and Mastura Y.
112 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 21 (S): 99 - 114 (2013)
vital to ensure sustained funding. The 
campaign must also be protected from any 
political attempts to divert funding or limit 
their scope from delivering the message. In 
the “TakNak” campaign, the message is to 
increase awareness among public, especially 
youths, on why they should not smoke and 
why they should quit smoking. However, 
some studies highlight that the combination 
messages of ‘why to quit’ and ‘how to quit” 
are more effective in changing smoker’s 
behavior (Wilson, 2005; Hammond et 
al., 2006). Thus, besides the “TakNak” 
message in the anti-smoking mass media 
campaign, the ‘how to quit’ message should 
be integrated into the campaign.
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